State of Utah v. Sioudone Phathmmavong : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
State of Utah v. Sioudone Phathmmavong : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
Cleve J. Hatch; Elkins and Associates; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Phathmmavong, No. 920342 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4283
y i ^ 
h , J 
D0OK/-1TN0. ^SMJMiA. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
SIOUDONE PHATHMMAVONG, 
Defendant and Appellant• 
Case No. 920342-CA 
Priority #2 
On Appeal From the Fourth Judicial District Court Of Utah 
County, State of Utah, Judge Boyd L. Park. 
Brief of the Appellant 
Cleve J. Hatch 
Elkins and Associates 
100 South 60 East 
Suite 100 
Provo, UT 84601 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
Jan Graham 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Authorities ii 
Statement of Jurisdiction 1 
Statement of the Issues 1 
Determinative Constitutional Provisions and Statutes 1 
Statement of the Case 2 
Summary of Argument 5 
Argument 6 
POINT I 6 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO DISPOSE OF THE CHARGES AGAINST 
THE DEFENDANT WITHIN THE 120 DAYS AS REQUIRED UNDER UTAH 
CODE ANN. §77-29-1. 
POINT II 15 
THE PRIMARY DELAYS IN THE DISPOSITION OF THE CASE WERE A 
RESULT OF THE MANEUVERS OF PROCEDURE EXERCISED BY THE 
STATE. 
POINT III 18 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE DEFENSE'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS BOTH COUNTS I AND II. 
Conclusion 19 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
State v. Farnsworth , 30 Utah 2d 435, 519 P.2d 244 (1974) ..16-17 
State v. Moore, 521 P.2d 556 (Utah 1974) 15-16 
State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d. 421 (Utah 1991) 8-12,14 
State v. Taylor, 538 P.2d 310 (Utah 1975) 6-8 
State v. Wilson, 593 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979) 13-14 
STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-103(1953, as amended) 2 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-29-01 (1953, as amended) 1-6,8-10,19 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-65-1 13,16-17 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2) (f), (1953, as amended) 1 
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 26 1 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
SIOUDONE PHATHMMAVONG, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No- 920342-CA 
Priority #2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(f) and Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, Rule 26. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
a. Did the Court fail to dispose the charges against the 
defendant within the 120 days as required by §77-29-1 U.C.A.? 
b. Were the primary delays in the disposition of the case a 
result of the maneuvers of procedure exercised by the state? 
c. Should the Court have granted the defense's Motion to 
Dismiss both counts I and II? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
A. There are no determinative constitutional provisions. 
B. Statutory Provisions - UTAH CODE ANN. §77-29-1 (1953, as 
amended). 
§77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending charge-
Duties of custodial officer-Continuance may be granted-
Dismissal of charge for failure to bring to trial. 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment 
in the state prison, jail or other penal or correctional 
institution of this state, and there is pending against the 
prisoner in this state any untried indictment or 
information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, 
sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any 
appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying 
the nature of the charge and court wherein it is pending and 
requesting disposition of the pending charge, he shall be 
entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120 days 
of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff, or custodial officer, upon receipt 
of the demand described in subsection (1), shall immediately 
cause the demand to be forwarded by personal delivery or 
certified mail, return receipt requested, to the appropriate 
prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff, 
or custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting 
attorney so notified, provide the attorney with such 
information concerning the term of commitment of the 
demanding prisoner as shall be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in 
subsection (1), the prosecuting attorney or the defendant or 
his counsel, for good cause shown in open court, with the 
prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any 
reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 
120 days, or within such continuance as has been granted, 
and the defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the 
action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court 
finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney is not 
supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for 
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the 
matter dismissed with prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant appeals the judgment, sentence, and commitment 
resulting from his conviction of Aggravated Assault, a Third 
Degree Felony, in violation of §76-5-103, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 as amended. 
The defendant was charged with Aggravated Assault, a Third 
Degree Felony, in relation to an event alleged to have occurred 
on or about June 14, 1991 in Utah County, Utah. On July 12, 
1991, the State of Utah filed an information charging the 
defendant with aggravated assault. (Exhibit 1). The information 
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was based upon an investigation by the Orem police who discovered 
that the assailant had used a gun to strike the victim's head and 
fire upon him. (Exhibit 2). On August 5, 1991, the defendant 
appeared before the Court and requested a preliminary 
examination. The preliminary examination was held on October 21, 
1991 and the matter was bound over to the Fourth District Court 
for Utah County before Judge Cullen Y. Christensen for appearance 
on November 15, 1991. (Exhibit 3). On August 23, 1991 the State 
of Utah, through its Adult Information and Parole Office, issued 
a Pre-revocation Hearing and served it upon defendant, Sioudone 
Phathmmavong. On August 27, 1991, the defendant was returned to 
the custody of the Utah State Prison at Draper, Utah. (Exhibit 
4). On September 19, 1991, defendant prepared a Notice and 
Request for Disposition of Pending Charges and hand-delivered it 
to Lynette Vance, a prison case worker. This notice was received 
by June Hinckley, an authorized agent of the DIO Record Unit of 
the Utah State Prison on October 8, 1991. (Exhibit 5). On or 
about October 8, 1991, June Hinckley forwarded to the Utah County 
Attorney's Office a Certificate of Inmate Status/120 Day 
Disposition and the Notice and Request of Disposition of Pending 
Charges. These documents were sent by certified mail, and 
received by the Utah Count Attorney's Office on October 11, 1991. 
(Exhibits 6 & 7). On November 20, 1991, the Board of Pardons 
denied review of the defendant's status until final disposition 
of the pending charges of aggravated assault in the Fourth 
District Court. (Exhibit 8). On November 22, 1991, the defendant 
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was arraigned before Judge Cullen Y. Christensen, entered a plea 
of not guilty, and trial was scheduled for December 11, 1991. 
(Exhibit 9). On December 11, 1991, the parties appeared for 
trial. The plaintiff indicated to the Court and to the defense 
counsel that a new witness had just been discovered and was 
present in court to testify. Counsel for the defense moved to 
continue the trial in order to interview the recently discovered 
witness. The Court continued the trial to January 6, 1992. 
(Exhibit 10). The case came to trial January 6, 1992 with both 
parties and a jury present. Counsel for the plaintiff made a 
Motion to Amend the Information to include a firearm enhancement 
provision and to change the charge from a third degree to a 
second degree felony. Counsel for the defendant objected to the 
motion of the State and the Court denied the Motion to Amend the 
Information. Thereafter, the State made a Motion to Dismiss the 
Criminal Information of Aggravated Assault. Counsel for the 
defendant objected to the Motion to Dismiss. The Court granted 
the Motion to Dismiss. (Exhibit 11). On January 13, 1992, the 
State prepared and filed a new information charging the defendant 
with Count I: Aggravated Assault, with a Firearm Enhancement 
Provision,a Second Degree felony and Count II: Possession of a 
Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony. 
(Exhibit 12). The defendant appeared on January 13, 1992 on the 
new information and requested a preliminary examination. The 
preliminary examination was conducted on February 18, 1992, and 
the matter bound over to the District Court on February 28, 1992 
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for arraignment before Judge Boyd L. Park. (Exhibit 13). On 
February 28, 1992, the defendant appeared with counsel before 
Judge Boyd L. Park and entered pleas of not guilty to the charges 
and trial was scheduled for March 23, 1992. (Exhibit 14). The 
defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the charges on March 4, 1992 
asserting that the court had failed to dispose of his pending 
charges within 120 days of his filing a Notice and a Request for 
Disposition of Pending Charges pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
§77-29-1. (Exhibit 15). The said motion was denied by 
memorandum decision on March 17, 1992. (Exhibit 16). The 
defendant was tried and convicted by a jury on March 23, 1992 of 
aggravated assault, after which the State dropped the charge of 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. (Exhibit 
17). On May 29, 1992 a Notice of Appeal was filed. (Exhibit 18). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant asserts that the Trial Judge should have granted 
his motion to dismiss to dismiss with prejudice both counts under 
which he was convicted due to the State's failure to bring the 
charges to trial within 120 days after Mr. Phathmmavong delivered 
the Notice and Request of Disposition of the charges pending 
against him, as required under Utah Code Annotated §77-29-1. The 
120 time period should extend from the time that the defendant 
handed his Request over to his prison caseworker. Additionally, 
the State's continual use of strategical manipulations should not 
be rewarded by allowing them to waylay the statute's 
requirements. The last minute use of witnesses and alterations 
5 
in the charges indicate a tendency to circumvent the intended 
purpose of the statute, which is to provide a speedy trial to 
those who are incarcerated and have charges pending against them. 
The attempt by the state to repress essentially identical charges 
in order to overcome the statutory time limitation should not be 
tolerated, and the charges should be dismissed with prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO DISPOSE OF THE CHARGES AGAINST 
THE DEFENDANT WITHIN THE 120 DAYS REQUIRED UNDER UTAH 
CODE ANN. §77-29-1. 
The statutory language of §77-29-1 guarantees a prisoner the 
right to have pending charges brought to trial within a 12 0 day 
period after the delivery of a written demand. There are several 
factors that deserve focus on when determining the 120 day period 
and the viability of the state to toll that time period that are 
at issue in this case. 
One factor influencing the length of time from notification 
to the time of the trial itself involves the issue of when 
delivery occurs. One Utah Supreme Court case that dealt with the 
issue of delivery to the warden or authorized representative was 
State v. Taylor, 538 P.2d 310 (Utah 1975). Taylor involved a 
defendant who was convicted of burglary of a dwelling and 
attempted theft. He was incarcerated while the charges he was 
eventually convicted on were pending. He gave written notice 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-65-1(a),(b), a precursor to the 
current §77-29-1, to an authorized agent of the warden. The 
notice was dated April 18, 1974, but the certified receipt which 
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the warden or his agent is required to complete was dated April 
19. The county attorney received the notice on April 22. The 
trial was held on July 19, 1974. At that time defendant's 
counsel moved to dismiss the charges because 92 days had passed 
since the warden's agent had received the notice. Id. at 311. 
The trial court said that the 90 day computation (as required by 
this older version of the statute) was determined from the date 
the notice was delivered to the County Attorney and Court, not to 
the warden. Id. at 312. 
On appeal the defendant claimed that the County Attorney and 
Court had imputed notice through the warden. While the Court did 
find that the statute requires that the notice and a mandatory 
certificate to be completed by the warden or his agent upon 
receipt of the notice must be sent to the County Attorney and 
Court, the warden or his agent are also required to act 
"promptly" in forwarding both documents to the attorney and 
Court. Id. at 312. The Court stated that this particular 
statute was a guideline to the time limits which "constitute a 
speedy public trial, as guaranteed an accused in criminal 
prosecutions under the constitution." The Court then went on to 
hold that "any attempt by the warden or his agents, to retain the 
request, or to fail to complete the certificate, beyond a 
reasonable time, or to misdirect the request would provide a 
basis for judicial relief." Id. at 313. 
In the instant case, the defendant delivered the complete 
and adequate notice, as required by the statute, to his 
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caseworker, Ms. Lynette Vance, on September 19, 1991. That 
notice was not received by the DIO agent, June Hinckley, until 
October 8, 1991, a full 19 days after Mr. Phathmmavong had 
delivered it. The purpose in providing the time guidelines under 
§77-29-1, like it predecessor in Taylor, is to guarantee the 
right to a speedy trial, especially under the circumstances here. 
In this case, the caseworker does represent, in all practical 
applications, an agent of the warden. The defendant here relied 
upon this agent to deliver the document to the appropriate 
authorities. It is our stipulation that the retention of the 
document from September 19 till October 8 was an unreasonable 
time. This Court has stipulated in Taylor that such actions will 
"violate a prisoner's right to a speedy trial and would provide a 
basis for judicial relief." Id. at 313. The 19 days should 
therefore be included in the time period used to figure the 120 
day limit designated by the statute. 
Regardless of the inclusion of the above discussed 19 day 
period, the state exceeded the 120 day time limit. Part 3 of the 
statute allows the prosecution, the defense and court leeway for 
a reasonable continuance based upon "good cause". Several cases 
have addressed the issue of good cause in this state. 
The first case, and most current, is State v. Petersen, 810 
P. 2d 421 (Utah 1991), as decided by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Petersen was convicted of aggravated burglary, two counts of 
attempted murder, and with being a habitual criminal. On July 6, 
1989 charges were brought, including possession of a firearm by a 
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prohibited person, based upon a previous conviction. On July 12 
he was held in the Utah State Prison pending a parole revocation 
hearing. On that date he also filed a Notice and Request for 
Disposition Pending Charges with an authorized agent of the Utah 
State Prison, as required by Utah Code Annotated §77-29-1. The 
County attorney received the copy but the court did not. On July 
27 the public defender was appointed as defense counsel. 
Arraignment was on September 6, at which time the defendant 
requested a new attorney due to dissatisfaction. The request was 
denied and, without objection, the trial was set for February 15, 
1990, over 218 days after defendant filed the notice. On 
January 5, 1990, Peterson's counsel sought to withdraw due to 
conflict. On January 12, the trial court denied the motion and 
appointed co-counsel. The new counsel filed a motion to dismiss 
based on a lapse of the 120 day time period. On February 15, 
1990 a hearing on the motion was held and the motion to dismiss 
was denied. Id. at 422. 
The trial court based dismissal on the fact that (1) the 
County Attorney had received the Notice of Disposition, but the 
Court had received no notice. (2) The Court asked Petersen 
whether the trial date was acceptable, and Petersen did not 
object to the date. (3) The trial date was set to allow time for 
the defendant and his counsel to resolve their differences. Id. 
at 422. The Court ruled in its conclusions at law that the trial 
date set on February 15 was within the 120 day period and was for 
good cause as it allowed Petersen and his counsel time to resolve 
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their differences. The Court also stated that the defendant 
waived the right to the 120 day limit by not objecting to the 
date of the trial. The Court then determined that it was 
Petersen's duty to show that the failure to try the case within 
the statutory time period resulted in prejudice to him or 
tactical advantage to the prosecutor. The Court found that 
Petersen could not show either factor and that the delay was not 
caused by the prosecutor. Id. at 423. 
Petersen was convicted thereafter in a jury trial of the 
murder and burglary charges and waived the right to a jury trial 
on the habitual criminal charges. The Court found him guilty on 
the latter charge and the prosecution dropped the unauthorized 
possession of a handgun charge. Id. at 423. 
The main question before the Supreme Court was whether or 
not Petersen had waived his rights by not objecting to the trial 
date. Id. at 423. The Court determined that it was a question 
of statutory construction and could therefore be reviewed for its 
correctness. The Court then went on to say that the burden to 
bring the case within the statutory period rested with the 
prosecutor. Petersen then was not required to object to the 
trial date to preserve his rights under the statute. Id. at 424. 
The Court held that a showing of "good cause" was to be 
applied in both §77-29-1 (3) and (4). IcL_ at 425. But the trial 
court erred in finding that Petersen's inability to show 
prejudice to himself or tactical advantage to the prosecutor was 
good cause. The statute states that if there is not "good cause" 
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for delay the court order will be dismissed. Id. at 425. The 
Court held that because neither attorney or defendant requested a 
continuance, the requirement of the statute was not met as it 
requires that "the prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his 
counsel may be granted reasonable continuances". Id. at 425. 
The Court also found that the delay was not reasonably based 
on the allotment of time for defendant and counsel to resolve 
their differences. In this case the trial court became aware of 
the problem 57 days after the notice was filed. There was plenty 
of time to resolve the problems, but the trial court did not feel 
a delay was necessary. Id. at 426. The Supreme Court held that 
the trial court's good cause was not. The charges were reversed, 
and dismissed with prejudice. Id. at 428. 
In the case at hand, the defendant, Mr. Phathmmavong, 
prepared the Request for Disposition on September 19, 1991 and it 
was delivered to the Utah County Attorney's Office on October 11, 
1991. The trial was originally scheduled for December 11, 1991, 
61 days after receipt of the Request by the County Attorney's 
Office. On December 11, both counsel for the defense requested 
a continuance to "depose a new witness" which the prosecution had 
only discovered, but who was present in court to testify. The 
court then continued the trial until January 6, 1992, 87 days 
after the Request was properly received. On January 6 when the 
case was called to trial, the County Attorney made a motion to 
amend the information to include a firearm enhancement and to 
change the charge to a second degree felony. Objection by the 
11 
defense counsel was sustained and the motion was denied. The 
State then made a Motion to Dismiss the Information. Defense 
counsel again objected on the grounds that it was untimely. The 
matter had been set for trial twice and the defendant was being 
held in Utah State Prison due to the charges. Counsel 
stipulated that the defendant's right to a speedy trial would be 
denied if the case was continued. The Court however granted the 
motion. New charges were filed by the state with the previously 
proposed enhancements on January 13, 1992, 94 days after receipt 
by the County Attorney of the Request for Disposition. Arraign-
ment and the requested preliminary hearing were set for February 
18, 1992, 125 days after receipt of the Request. The matter was 
then bound over to the District Court for February 28, 135 days 
after the Request for Disposition was received. Trial was set 
for March 23, 1992, 159 days after receipt by the County Attorney 
of the Request for Disposition. 
On January 6th, neither the defendant nor his counsel made a 
request for continuance. The defendant, in fact, objected to the 
dismissal of charges due to the very fact that a continuance of 
this sort would deny him the right to a speedy trial. The delay 
caused by the granting of the dismissal and the refiling of the 
charges with the enhanced penalties does not constitute the good 
cause as discussed in Petersen. The State had been aware from 
the beginning of the investigation in June of 1991 that a firearm 
was a key instrument in the crime. The wounds sustained by the 
victim and witness testimony all refer to the use of a firearm. 
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The state then should have included these provisions from the 
beginning. The possession of a firearm by a restricted person 
charge should also have been brought from the very beginning. 
The dismissal and refiling of the same charge with weapons 
enhancements, along with the separate possession by a restricted 
person count are not good cause reasons to extend to time period. 
The lack of inclusion by the prosecutor of the enhanced charges 
should not and cannot be allowed to qualify as "good cause" in 
this situation. 
In State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453 P.2d 158 (1969) the 
Supreme Court dealt with some principals underlying the intent of 
the legislature in passing Utah Code Annotated §77-65-1, the 
predecessor to the section under discussion in this case. Wilson 
was serving a sentence for robbery. While incarcerated, a 
complaint was filed charging him with forgery. On February 27, 
1967 he filed a Request for Final Disposition of the forgery 
charge with an authorized agent. On April 10, 19 67 he was bound 
over for district court and trial was set for June 6, 1967. 
Defendant made no comment as to the time period and no 
objections. At the trial, defendant moved to dismiss based on 
the lapse of the 90 day period according to the statute. Id. at 
362, 159. The Court in addressing the issue emphasized that the 
continuance or time period between the Request for Final 
Disposition and the trial must be based on good cause. Id. at 
362, 159. The Court then went on to explore the reasoning 
behind the passage of the statute. It stated that its intent was 
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to provide a speedy trial. The Court then said "It is apparent 
that the intent of the legislature was to prevent those charged 
with enforcement of criminal statutes from holding over the head 
of a prisoner undisposed of charges against him." Id. at 363,159. 
The very purpose of the legislature in adopting the statute 
as indicated by Wilson would be destroyed if the State's refiling 
of the charges is accepted by the court. The State would in 
effect, be able to hold the additional charge of "possession of a 
firearm by a restricted person" over the heads of many prisoners. 
This would be in direct conflict with the Court's determination 
of the statutory intent. 
The possession by a restricted person charge is dependent 
upon and a part of the original charges. At the trial itself, 
the charge was not addressed until after the first charge of 
aggravated assault had been tried. If the State is allowed to 
extend the time limit by adding such parasitic charges, the 
purpose of this statute in providing a speedy trial, as was 
discussed in Petersen and Wilson, would be circumvented and the 
statute would be a hollow shell of the legislature's intent. 
Even disregarding the time period that the caseworker held 
the Request and the time period the trial was delayed so that the 
defense could interview the prosecution's last minute witness, 
there was still a time period of 133 days that lapsed before this 
case came to trial. This lapse and the lack of good cause on the 
part of the prosecutor in allowing this delay should result in 
the dismissal of charges with prejudice. 
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II. THE PRIMARY DELAYS IN THE DISPOSITION OF THE CASE WERE A 
RESULT OF THE MANEUVERS OF PROCEDURE EXERCISED BY THE 
STATE. 
The primary delay in this case was caused by the dismissal 
of the first complaint and the subsequent recharging of the same 
complaint with the firearm enhancement provision and the separate 
but co-dependent count of possession by a restricted person. The 
Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of charging of complaints 
that were identical to those previously dismissed by the State 
in State v. Moore, 521 P.2d 556 (Utah 1974). 
In Moore, the defendant was convicted of selling controlled 
substances. On September 17, 1977 two complaints were filed in 
the trial court against the defendant for selling marijuana and 
heroin. A preliminary trial was set for November 26, 1971, but 
the prosecution was not ready at that time. A continuance was 
granted. On that day the defendant was taken into custody in 
violation of parole and returned to the Utah State Prison on 
December 2. On December 30, the defendant delivered the Request 
for Final Disposition to the authorized person. A preliminary 
examination was held on February 8, 1972, but again the 
prosecution was not ready. The State moved for another 
continuance but the Court ordered the counts dismissed for 
failure of the State to prosecute. On February 9, 1972, new 
complaints, identical to the previously dismissed charges were 
made. At a preliminary hearing in the City Court on March 8 the 
defendant renewed the Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
On April 12th, the defendant was found guilty. The defendant 
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appealed the conviction on the basis that there was no good cause 
for the delay in his trial, as both sets of charges were 
identical. The Court looked to §77-65-1 (a) of the previous 
version of the code. Id. at 557. The Court determined that "the 
procedure of dismissing a complaint or an information and 
thereafter filing a complaint or an information charging an 
identical offense cannot be used by a prosecutor to avoid a 
mandate of the statute as was done here." Id. at 558. 
In the case in question, the state used similar tactics to 
achieve their goal and to overcome a deficiency in their case. 
As was discussed previously, the State wanted to dismiss the 
charges because it had neglected to previously include the 
firearms enhancement and the possession count. The State knew of 
the information in the investigation that led to these eventual 
additions from the beginning of the case. They had ample time to 
have amended or even dismissed the charges at an earlier date. 
However, the State chose to dismiss these charges with only a 
little over 30 days left in the time period, and the trial itself 
was not rescheduled until a considerable time after the 120 day 
limit. The tactics used here in delaying the trial in order to 
circumvent the statute are precisely those the Court warned about 
in Moore. 
A case that further delineates the rule set in Moore, is 
State v. Farnsworth, 519 P.2d 244 (Utah 1974). The defendant in 
that case was convicted of Burglary in the 2nd degree and Grand 
Larceny. His appeal was based on a denial of a speedy trial. 
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The facts of the case are that on June 19, 1972 a complaint was 
filed for the burglary of Strebel's Taxidermist. Officers went 
to his home and conducted a search and found white powder in a 
bag. He was then charged with possession of a controlled 
substance. The next day the Utah State Board of Pardons issued a 
warrant for violation of parole. Several days later the drug 
charges were dropped, but the defendant was not released. 
Another complaint was filed for burglarizing the Adult Probation 
and Parole Department Office in Ogden. On June 27, the defendant 
filed a written request for Disposition of all charges within 90 
days, as required then under Utah Code Annotated §77-65-1. The 
charges were dismissed for insufficient evidence but on October 
12, the same day as the dismissal, the State filed a complaint on 
the burglary charges of the Ben Lomand Animal Hospital. 
Defendant was brought to trial on December 13, 1972 where he was 
found guilty. On appeal the defendant argued that any accusation 
against him whether charged or not must be disposed of within the 
90 day period. The Court said that the Request for Disposition 
did not apply to unfiled charges. 
The defendant's case here can be distinguished from 
Farnsworth. The counts discussed in Farnsworth all involved acts 
that were distinctly separate. The charges that the defendant in 
that case tried to include under the Request for Disposition had 
no relation other than the fact that the state brought the 
charges during approximately the same period. In Mr. 
Phathammavong's case, the charges brought by the State were so 
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similar as to be considered identical. The amendments requested 
by the State on January 6, while changing the degree of the 
charge, and therefore altering the punishment were all based upon 
the exact same incident and the same base charge, that of 
aggravated assault. The only real differentiation between the 
two charges was the time period involved in the sentencing and 
they were not sustainable by the Prosecution as distinctive 
counts. 
While the introduction of a witness at the last minute may 
not necessarily be a maneuver by the State to delay the trial, 
when considering the totality of the effect of the State's 
manipulations regarding the time period in this case, the Court 
could find that the introduction of the last minute witness at 
the first trial date was such an attempt, especially since the 
witness was ready for trial that very day, while the defense had 
no notification of the witness prior to the scheduled trial time. 
III. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE DEFENSE'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS BOTH COUNTS I AND II. 
While the trial court denied the State's Motion to amend the 
original charges, it essentially allowed the same effect to occur 
by permitting the state to dismiss the original charges and to 
refile the same charges with the desired amendments. As was 
discussed in the above section, however, because the counts are 
essentially identical and therefore good cause for the lapse of 
the statutory period cannot be justified, the trial court should 
have dismissed the charges with prejudice. The fact that the 
second count in the trial was not included in the first 
18 
indictment should not dissuade the court from dismissing the 
charges as the second count was so involved with the first count 
as to be virtually inseparable. The court should have therefore, 
for these and the reasons already stated have dismissed both 
counts with prejudice for having exceeded the statutory period 
found in §77-29-1. 
While in determining the statutory period the court should 
include the time period that ran due to the caseworker's 
unwarranted holding of the Notice filed by the defendant on 
September 18, as well as the time period that was reguired for 
the defense to interview the last minute witness in the 
determination of the 120 day time period, even if when these time 
periods are tolled, the remaining time that passed from the 
filing to the trial exceeded the 120 day period by over ten days. 
Considering the fact that the Prosecutor could have easily stayed 
within the time period allotted by the statute if the information 
had been processed correctly, the lapse of the time period cannot 
reasonably be expected to be extended for good cause. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in denying the Motion to Dismiss due 
to the failure of the State to bring the charges to trial within 
the statutory 120 limit. The time period ran from, at the 
earliest, September 19 thru March 23. While the Court may 
disagree as to whether or not the continuance to interview the 
witness and the time period during which the caseworker kept the 
Notice and Request, the time period still exceeded the 120 limit 
19 
when the case was finally brought to trial on March 23, 1992. The 
fact that the counts had been dropped and recharged later should 
have no tolling effect on the time period. 
Dated this — ^ day of February, 1993. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
Hailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to Jan Graham, Utah Attorney General, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, this 3 day of 
February, 1993. 
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ADDENDUM 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-1 (1953, as amended) 
§77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending charge-
Duties of custodial officer-Continuance may be granted-
Dismissal of charge for failure to bring to trial. 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in 
the state prison, jail or other penal or correctional 
institution of this state, and there is pending against the 
prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, 
and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or 
custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of 
the same, a written demand specifying the nature of the charge 
and court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of 
the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of 
written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff, or custodial officer, upon receipt 
of the demand described in subsection (1), shall immediately 
cause the demand to be forwarded by personal delivery or 
certified mail, return receipt requested, to the appropriate 
prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff, or 
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting 
attorney so notified, provide the attorney with such 
information concerning the term of commitment of the demanding 
prisoner as shall be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in 
subsection (1), the prosecuting attorney or the defendant or 
his counsel, for good cause shown in open court, with the 
prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any 
reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 
120 days, or within such continuance as has been granted, and 
the defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the action, the 
court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that 
the failure of the prosecuting attorney is not supported by 
good cause, whether a previous motion for continuance was made 
or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with 
prejudice. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3-(2)(f) (1953, as amended). 
§78-2a-3-(2)(f). Court of Appeals Jurisdiction 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, 
over: 
(f) appeals form a court of record in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of 
first degree or capital felony; 
A-l 
A - z 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 27 
Rule 26. Filing and service of briefs. 
(a) Time for serving and filing briefs. The appellant shall serve and file 
a brief within 40 days after date of notice from the clerk of the appellate court 
pursuant to Rule 13, unless a motion for summary disposition has been previ-
ously interposed pursuant to Rule 10, in which event service and filing shall 
be within 30 days from the denial of such motion. The appellee shall serve and 
file a brief within 30 days after service of the appellant's brief. A reply brief 
may be served and filed by the appellant within 30 days after the filing and 
service of the appellee's brief, but, except for good cause shown, a reply brief 
must be served and filed at least 10 days before argument. By stipulation filed 
with the court, the parties may extend each of such periods for no more than 
30 days in civil cases or 15 days in criminal cases. No such stipulation shall be 
effective unless it is filed prior to the expiration of the period sought to be 
extended. 
(b) Number of copies to be filed and served. Ten copies of each brief, 
one of which shall contain an original signature, shall be filed with the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court. Eight copies of each brief, one of which shall contain an 
original signature, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. Four 
copies shall be served on counsel for each party separately represented. 
(c) Consequence of failure to file briefs. If an appellant fails to file a 
brief within the time provided in this rule, or within the time as may be 
extended by order of the appellate court, an appellee may move for dismissal 
of the appeal. If an appellee fails to file a brief within the time provided by 
this rule, or within the time as may be extended by order of the appellate 
court, an appellant may move that the appellee not be heard at oral argu-
ment. 
(d) Return of record to the clerk. Each party, upon the filing of its brief, 
shall return the record to the clerk of the court having custody pursuant to 
these rules. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. 5 Am. Jur 2d Appeal and A.L.R. — Consequences of prosecution's fail-
Error § 688. ure to file timely brief in appeal by accused, 27 
C.J.S. - 5 C J . S Appeal and Error §§ 1337 A.L R 4th 213 
to 1342. Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «= 765 
Rule 27. Form of briefs. 
(a) Paper size; printing and spacing. Briefs shall be typewritten, printed 
or prepared by photocopying or other duplicating or copying process that will 
produce clear, black and permanent copies equally legible to printing, in type 
not smaller than ten characters per inch, on opaque, unglazed white paper 8V2 
inches wide and 11 inches long, and shall be securely bound along the left 
margin. The impression must be double spaced, except for matter customarily 
single spaced and indented, with adequate margins on the top and sides of 
each page. 
(b) Binding. Briefs shall be printed on both sides of the page, and bound 
with a compact-type binding so as not unduly to increase the thickness of the 
brief along the bound side. Coiled plastic and spiral-type bindings are not 
acceptable. 
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KAY BRYSON #0473 
Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 370-8026 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs. 
SIOUDONE PHATHMMAVONG 
Address Unknown 
DOB: 8 -16-70 
INFORMATION 
Cr imina l No. 
qnccin? 
Defendant(s) 
KAY BRYSON, Utah County Attorney, State of Utah,accuses the defendant(s)" 
of the following crime(s): 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of 76-5-
103, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that he, on or 
about June 15, 1991, in Utah County, Utah, did attempt with 
unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another by 
using such means or force likely to produce death or serious 
bodily injury. 
Information is based on evidence sworn to by: Mike Larsen, Orem 
PD 
Authorized for prosecution by: 
>&^j£* ^A^A^ 
UTAH C O U l O Y A T r D R f l E Y ^ ^ ^ ^ 
7-11-91 
C0MPLM7I/WT 
Subscribed _a|id sworn to* before 
me this / <L_day of \J~iJ 1991 
/ \ 
/ _ 
JUDGE? 
*.d 
EXHIBIT 1 
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*: PROVO CANYON STATES LJT AGE; 17 LATE OF BIFT'ri, '. /:•'•>/7Z 
::? MEXICAN SEXt MALE H--\ WOT HAIR; 
:AL. HAIR: EYES: OG.IF; bu:.i...i;i; 
^ERS L1C, STATE, #! 
..OYMENT! ADbR: 
J " 002 SUSPECT 
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:IAL. HAIR: EYES: BROWN 
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A-4(b) 
Tommy M a r t i n e z s u s t a i n e d i n j u r i e s to h i s h ^ d thd c , - * * * . . *u n u * e r . . u , 
s t i t c h e s t o e Lose• 
I spok« w i t h Mont Cour t of Utah Adul t P T oU.W . on - t - P a r u L e . nont , s 
S i o u d o n e ' s P a r o l e o f f i c e r . Mont t o l d me i h r . t ;*! Q u ? ° r * ' - . ^ i d o . . * 
p e r m i s s i o n to t r a v e l to Arkansas to l i v e u . l h h . s r - , h e . - - . « « d — 
l e f t f o r AvkaTisas t o d a y . 
S g t . M4 L d r a e n 4 1 1 
GTNrtL INPUT BY! PS32BC 
ROVING SUPERVISOR 
CASE NUfiBER; I»P0vU3ivO 
fTcEFARED I-Y: 
FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES ONLY. 
P H A S E D SYTHE CCUHTY ATTOfiNEYTO. 
PUBLIC DEPPNDESS. 
A - A ( c ) 
FOURTH CIRCUIT, COURT JV STATE OF .UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY .^OREM DEPARTMENT,' 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
SIOUDONE PHATHAMMAVONG 
c/o JIMI MITSUNAGA, Attorney 
731 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
DOB: 08-16-70 Male 
Defendant) 
25.;« 
BINDOVER ORDER 
Case No. 911001115 FS 
INFORMATION FILED ON July,12, 1901 
FIRST APPEARANCE HEARING HELD ON August 5,f1991 
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION HELD ON October 21; 1991 
Appearing for the State of Utah: Sherry Ragan 
Appearing for the Defendant:. ldSSBiH46*^fmxana& 
BIND-OVER ORDER 
DEFENDANT'S NAME: Sioudohe Phathammavong 
CRIME CHARGED: Aggravated Assault', a Third Degree Felony 
a the evidence presented^at«<the- preliminary examination the 
•.gned magistrate £4.nds .probables cause t6<Fb,elieve that the 
Ci.. charged has been committed andIthat;, fchefdefendant committed 
the same. It is ORDERED,, thatithe defendant, b^bound over to answer 
said charge in the Four5hfDis£rict Court iin.anfi.for Utah County, 
State of Utah before Judge CULLIN CHRJSTENSEN$dn;No 
at the hour of 2:30 P.M. 
vember 15, 1991 
in his courtroom 4 3 62'(2* 
DATED: October 25,v1991 
Circuit Court Judge 
transmitted to the Clerk of-the District Court October 25> 1991 by 
the undersigned. 
Deputy Clerk 
EXKSMiS?^ 
A-S 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADULT PRORATION AND PAROLE 
PREREVDCATION HEARING INFORMATION 
Tn the Matter of: SIOUDONE PHAT1WMAVON3 
OBSCTS 9: 00052118 USP //: 19643 
The State of Utah, Adult Probation and Parole, accuses SIOUDONE PHATTIAMMAVONG 
of violation of his parole in the following particulars, to-wit: 
1. By having committed the offense of Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree 
Felony, on or about the 15th day of June, 1991 in Utah County, State 
of Utah, in violation of condition number three of the Parole 
Agreement, 
and charges that the same SIOUDONE PHATHA^VONG was paroled from the Utah 
State Prison on the ?6th day of March, 1991, and the above conduct is in 
violation of his parole. 
All accused parole violators have the right to respond to the allegations made 
against them, to have voluntary witnesses appear on their behalf, present 
relevant evidence by affidavit or by other means and the right to question 
persons having information on which the alleged parole violations are based. 
However, if the hearing officer determines that the witness would be subject 
to risk or harm if his identity were disclosed, he need not be subjected to 
confrontation and cross -examination. 
DATTP this ?2rd day of August, 1991. 
A j r i l L. y . Rflwie 
DistrictsAgent 
hL. 
EXHIBIT 4 
A-6 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION 
OF PENDING CHARGE(S) 
TO: 0 , LANE McCOTTER, DIRECTOR OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS 
Not i ce i s hereby g i v e n tha t I , ^ ( Q Q ^ A ^ 9haVWvvx<v\as/(ma do 
hereby reques t f i n a l d i s p o s i t i o n of any charge (s) now pendirrg 
a g a i n s t me in any court in the S t a t e o f .Utah , Charge(s) are now 
pending a g a i n s t me in the c o u r t ( s ) of thstt^V loor* oC Ofru.U COO»VK/ 
county and reques t i s hereby made t h a t you forward t h i s n o t i c e uo 
the appropr iate a u t h o r i t i e s in t h a t county together with such 
in format ion as required by law. 
Assault , 3rd Degree 
Dated this / ? ^ day of ^xp+mktr 199 J_ 
- ~^~*/r^^l4r LELk!£l 
InSate^Name ~^ USP # 
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t I have rece ived a copy of the forego ing 
n o t i c e t h i s ^ ^ day of (1)sJrh<^> 199 / 
</tj>c^ ^z^Jy^yf 
y^V AUTHORIZE^ AGENT 
f DIO RECORD UNIT 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
P.O. BOX 250 
DRAPER, UTAH 84020 
EXHIBIT 5 
A-7 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
CERTIFICATE OF INMATE STATUS / 120-DAY DISPOSITION 
TO: 
RE: 
Utah County Attorney 
Sioudone PhathammavonR 
Inmate's Name 
19643 
USP # 
TERM OF COMMITMENT: 
TIME SERVED: 
TIME REMAINING: 
PAROLE ELIGIBILITY: 
BOARD OF PARDONS 
DECISION: 
1 to 15, 1 to 15 CC 
2 yrs . 
13 Yrs. 
Returned 8/27/91 on Parole Violation. Has nni- received 
new parole date as of th i s date. 
0 . LANE McCOTTER 
DIRECTOR OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS 
y AUTHORIZED J :ED A( 
DIO RECORD UNIT 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
P.O. BOX 250 
DRAPER, UTAH 84020 
cc: County Clerk 
File 
EXHIBIT 6 
A-8 
© SENDER: Complete items 1 and 2 when additional services art deuted. and compieta it ems 3 and 4. 
Put yout address in the "RETURN TO" Space on the reverse side. Failure to do this will prevent this card 
from be«ng returned to you. The return recetpt fee will provide you the name of the person delivered to and 
the dote of delivery For additional fees the following services are available. Consult postmaster for feet 
and check boxteslfor additional service<s> requested.' 
1. C Show to whom delivered, date, and addressee's address. 2. D Restricted Delivery 
(Extra charge) (Extra charge) 
3. Article Addressed to: 
Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center 
Provo, Utah 
84606 
4. Article Number 
P-??6 544 148 
Type of Service: 
LJ Registered 
Certified 
LJ Express Mail 
LJ Insured 
• COO 
f""| Return Receipt 
for Merchandise 
Always obtain signature of addressee 
0/ agent and OATE 0EL1VERSD. 
5. Signature — Addressee 
X 
6. Signature - /y \gent 
x
 L 
7. Date of Delivery 
8. Addressee's Address (ONLY if 
requested and fee paid) 
PS Form 3 8 1 1/Apr./1989 • u-S.G-P.o. m»-23s-«is DOMESTIC RETURN RECEIPT 
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE 
OFFICIAL BUSINESS 
SENDER INSTRUCTIONS 
Print your name, address and ZIP C o o s J ^ ^ S 9 ^ 
k\ the speca below. ••)•*. — 
• Compieta items 1. 2. 3. and 4 on the 
reverse. 
• Attach to front of article rf space 
permits, otherwise affix to back of 
article. 
• Endorse article "Return Receipt 
Requested" adjacent to number. 
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE 
USE. 1300 
RETURN 
TO 
Print Sender's name, address, and ZIP Code in the space below. 
June Hinckley, Records & I.D Officer 
P.O. Box 250 
Re: S»RiathanrTiavone 
19643 
Draper, Utah 84020 
EXHIBIT 7 
< v —<y 
State of Utah 
BOARD OF PARDONS 
448 East 6400 South - Suite 300 
Murray. Utah 84107 
(801)261-6464 
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
H.L. (Pete) Haun 
Chairman 
Donald E. BUnchard 
Michael R. Sibbett 
William L. Peter* 
Heather N. Cooke 
Members 
Sioudone Phathammavon, USP# 19643 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Dear Mr, Sioudone: 
November 1, 1991 
You are scheduled to appear before the Board of Pardons in the matter of a Parole 
Violation Hearing on November 20, 1991, at 3:00 pm. 
Prior to your appearance before the Board, a Parole Office representative will ser 
you with a copy of the charges against you, and will explain your rights at the 
hearing. You have the right to be represented by an attorney. The law firm of Yengil 
Rich, Xaiz and Metos will provide legal service for this hearing to you free of charge 
A representative will contact you prior to your scheduled hearing date. However, if y 
wish to have your own attorney represent you, you will need to submit your request to 
in writing and have them contact our office rigiit away. 
Family members, friends and other visitors are allowed to attend the hearing, but 
are not allowed to speak. ^ 
Through a change in the law, if your victim(s) request it, they will be allowed tc 
speak at your hearing. They may also request that you leave the room while this 
testimony is being presented. If so, you will be given the opportunity to listen to < 
tape recording of that testimony before the hearing continues. 
In connection with your upcoming hearing, everything in your Board file may be 
considered. Like other offenders' files, your file contains its own variation of the' 
following categories of information: 
(1) Public information, including judgment and commitment orders, prior Board 
dispositions, parole agreements, and the like; 
(2) Information generated from Adult Probation and Parole, including presentence 
and postsentence reports, probation violation reports, parole progress and violation 
reports, diagnostic reports, and so forth; 
(3) Prison information, including board reports, disciplinaries, progress and 
rescission reports, psychologicals, etc.; 
(A) Information generated internally for the Board, including worksheets, routin 
guideline matrices, alienist reports, warrant requests; 
(5) Other criminal justice information, including police and prosecutorial repor 
recommendations from sentencing judges, criminal record data, other court documents; 
(6) Other correspondence sent to the Board ronrernjng you. 
Any other specific items of information to l>^  mus i «lered by the Board will be 
identified for you at the hearing and you will li^ ve an opportunity to respond at that 
time. 
Sincerely, - - ^  
KARAN D. PACE 
Hearing Officer 
~. —, . tion EXHIBIT8 
NOV, 2 6 1991 
IN THE .FOURTH*JUDICIAL DISTRICT,,COURT 
UTAH ^  COUNTY,'? STATE OF - UTAH • 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SIOUDONE PHATHAMMAVONG 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER: 911400516 
DATE: November 22, 1991 
CULLEN Yi CHRISTENSEN, JU 
Reptj E.V.Quist, CSR 
ARRAIGNMENT-TRIAL DATE SCHEDULED 
This was the timefset for arraignment on a charge of 
Aggravated Assault, a 3rd Degree Felony. Claudia Laycock, Depu 
County Attorney,' appearedCon*behalfVof the'State of Utah- The < 
was present in CourtJand"was ,'represented by Donald Elkins, who 
appeared in place of Jimi'Mitsunagaj' counsel • of record. 
The defendnat waived-.the* reading of the Information, 
having been furnished with aHcopy in;Circuit Court. 
To thercharge contained. in*the Information, the def 
entered a plea of^Not Guilty* 
The Court'set.,the .matter?for trial on Wednesday, 
f D e c e m b e r ^ l ^ 9 ^ ^ Request for jury 
instructions to}be < submitted /to/theJ^Court by December 4 th, L991, 
A copy-of this"minute?entryjmailed to counsel. 
cc: Utah County Attorney 
Jimi Mitsunaga,'Esq. 
Donald Elkins,,Esq. -
^ ^ T R T T T ^ 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ^ 
Plaintiff, CASE NUMBER: 911400516 
vs. DATE: December 11, 1991 
SIOUDONE PHATHAMMAVONG CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE 
Defendant. Rept: E.V.Quist, CSR 
TRIAL RESCHEDULED 
This was the time set for trial in the above captioned 
matter with Sherry Ragan, Deputy County Attorney, appearing on 
behalf of the State of Utah. The defendant was present in Court 
along with counsel Jimi Mitsunaga. 
For the record the def previously entered a plea of Not 
Guilty to a charge of aggravated assault, a 3rd Degree Felony and 
matter was scheduled for todays jury trial. 
The following jurors were called to appear for 
qualifications in todays hearing: 
Norma J. Anderson, Faye S. Belliston, Harold W. Balck, 
Richard Colborn, Jeanne Crews, Tex Gifford, Ronald Dean Halls, 
Brad Huish, Tim Kuchar, Richard J. mcClendon, Jessie McQuivey, 
Michael J. Newson, Dane jay Parker, LaVerne pennock, Judith A. 
Rasband, Wilma Riddle, Deborah Rodabough, Dean Shimmin, Kaye 
L.W.Smith, Jerry J. Stubbs, Gary W. Thompson, Jerry L. Walker, 
Toni Kaye Wall, DRichard C. Worthen, Tina Renee Young and Slade 
L»? \ r> 7, <\ V) u i s K i s . 
At this time a conference was held in chambers. Both 
counsel present. 
Mr. Mitsunaga addressed the Court and indicated that two 
of the witnesses that both the State and Defense have been looking 
for have now surfaced. Counsel requested a continuance of the 
trial as to allow time for both counsel to depos these witnesses. 
EXHIBIT 10 
The State has no objections to a continuance. Matter 
discussed. 
The Court reconvened. Counsel, defendant and 
prospective jurors present. 
The Court addressed the jury panel and informed them 
that todays trial is vacated on stipulation of counsel and their 
services will not be needed today. The panel was thanked and 
excused from the Court room. 
The Court rescheduled the trial for Monday, January 6th 
1992 at 9:00 a.m. with a Jury. Any further amendments to be 
filed by next Monday, December 16th, 1991. For the record the 
Court notes that there is also another criminal trial set for tha 
same day which another Judge may have to hear. 
Ms Ragan addressed the Court and requested Court 
admonish the defs family not to contact or harrass the victim or 
witnesses in this matter. 
The Court cautioned defense counsel to advise the defs 
family not to interfer or contact any of the potential witnesses. 
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the Utah 
County Sheriff. 
A copy of this minute entry mailed to counsel. 
cc: Utah County Attorney 
Jimi Mitsunaga, Esq. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT \ , %, ' '<£ 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH %, /* 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
SIOUDONE PHATHAMMAVONG 
Defendant, 
CASE NUMBER: 911400516 
DATE: January 6, 1992 
CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE 
Rept: E.V.Quist, CSR 
INFORMATION DISMISSED 
This was the time set for trial in the above captioned 
matter with Sherry Ragan, Deputy County Attorney, appearing on 
behalf of the State of UTah. The def was present in Court along 
with counsel Jimi Mitsunaga. 
The defendant has been charged with the crime of 
Aggravated Assault, a 3rd Degree Felony, to which def entered a 
plea of Not Guilty and matter was set for trial. 
The following prospective jurors were called to appear 
and be qualified for this 1st 1992 term of Court: 
Gary Bascom, Chris Blackhurst, LaReta Brinkeroff, Melani 
Burningham, Noel N. Cardon, C. Floyd David, Steve R. Evon, Verlene 
Gagon, Stephanie Hathaway, John L. Jensen, Sonya M. LeBaron, 
Daniel Ray Maxwell, Lorena Olsen, Vaughn Pack, Garth Lynn Roundy, 
John Simmons, Eva Bell Smith, Laur Jean Stacy, Marilyn D. Steele, 
Paul B. Stott, Stanley LeLand Taylor, Richard Garth Wilkinson, 
Mark Woofinden, and Phillip Young. 
At this time counsel met with the Court in chambers 
outside the hearing of the prospective jurors. Matter was 
reported. 
EXHIBIT 11 
At this time Ms Ragan made a Motion to amend the 
Information and include the firearm enhancement making the charge 
a 2nd Degree Felony. 
Mr. Mitsunaga objected and argued same. 
The Court denied the motion to Amend the Information. 
The State made a Motion to Dismiss with the 
understanding the State will refile the charge under the 
enhancement statute. 
Mr. Mitsunaga objected as motion being untimely and the 
fact that this is the 2nd time this matter has been set for 
trial. The def is being held in the Utah State Prison and one of 
the reasons for the parole violation was this case. By d^f not: 
being allowed to proceed at this time denies defs right to a 
speedy trial. 
The Court finds there is no information to prevent the 
State from pursuing the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion to 
Dismiss is therefore granted. To the extent def is being held in 
custody in this case, he may now be released, subject to being 
held on other matters other than this particular case. 
10:30 a.m. Court reconvened. Counsel, Defendant and 
all prospective jurors present in Court. 
The Court addressed the jury panel and explained that 
other arrangements have been made in this matter and there 
services will be be required for today but this is a new panel and 
needs to be qualified for the 1st 1992 term of Court. 
The clerk gave the prospective jurors the oath. 
Statutory questions asked by the Court. 
The Court finds the above jurors are qualified to serve 
in this term of Court. The jurors were thanked and excused form 
further duty today. 
Court in recess 
A-13(b) 
4THUI':'^~{ 
c-
KAY BRYSON #0473 ' '• 
Utah County Attorney r 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 ' ffi/u Cj c 
Provo, Utah 84606 Ay-
Telephone: (801) 370-8026 r T 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT 
8 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SIOUDONE PHATHAMMAVONG 
Utah State Prison 
DOB: 8-16-70 
INFORMATION 
Defendant(s) 
Criminal No. 
9 2/-0O 
KAY BRYSON, Utah County Attorney, State of Utah,accuses the defendants) 
of the following crime(s): 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, in violaiton of 76-5-
103 & 76-3-203(3)(Firearm Enhancement), Utah Code Annotated, 1954 
as amended, in that he, on or about June 14, 1991, in Utah 
County, Utah, did knowingly and intentionally assault Tommy 
Martinez and cause severe bodily injury to Tommy Martinez and/or 
did knowingly and intentionally assault Tommy Martinez by use of 
a deadly weapon, to:wit a firearm. 
Notice: If the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or 
the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or 
furtherance of the felony, the court may additionally sentence 
the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
COUNT II: POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A RESTRICTED 
PERSON, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of 76-10-503, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that he, on or about June 14, 
1991, in Utah County, Utah, a person who is on parole or 
probation for a felony, had in is possession or under his custody 
or control a dangerous weapon, namely, a firearm. 
EXHIBIT 12 
Informat ion i s based on evidence sworn to by: Mike Larsen , Orem 
PD 
A u t h o r i z e d f o r p r o s e c u t i o n b y : 
UTAH COUWY ATTORNEY 9 
COJJPLA 
xT^Z-
INANT 
DEPU 
1-6-92 
Subscr ibed and sworn t o before 
me t h i s }^ day of J_9 1 9 9 ^ 
^&Zfy0Wf 
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FOuivTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF uTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs 
Plaintiff, 
SIOUDONE PHATHAMMAVONG 
c/o Gary Weight 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box ML" 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Defendant. 
) 
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BINDOVER ORDER U L 
Case No. 921-60 FS *kfC 
INFORMATION FILED ON 
FIRST APPEARANCE HEARING HELD ON 
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION HELD ON 
Appearing for the State of Utah: 
Appearing for the Defendant: 
BIND-OVER ORDER 
January 13, 1992 
January 13, 1992 
February 18, 1992 
Sherry Ragan 
Gary Weight 
DEFENDANT'S NAME: SIOUDONE PHATHAMMAVONG 
CRIME CHARGED: Count I - Aggravated Assault - 3rd Degree; 
Count II - Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person -
3rd Degree.4d 
From the evidence presented at the preliminary examination the 
undersigned magistrate finds probable cause to believe that the 
crime charged has been committed and that the defendant committed 
the same. It is ORDERED that the defendant be bound over to answer 
said charge in the Fourth District Court in and for Ut< 
State of Utah before JUDGE BOYD L. PARK on February^^f^S^Sfset the 
hour of 9:00 A.M. in his courtroom # 402 4 
DATED: February 18, 1992 
sC"& 
This order and all pleadings in and records made of trftO^ asMffereeaing 
in this case (except tape number 92-1-67 which have been retained 
subject to order of the District Court) tramsmitted to the Clerk o 
the District Court February 19, 1992, by the undersigned. 
Deputy Clerk 
EXHIBIT 13 
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FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
. CARMAB. SMITH Clerk 
c g - ^ y ^ ^ j ^ - DepUty 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * 
CASE NUMBER: 921400082 
MINUTE ENTRY 
DATE: February 28, 1992 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
Rpt. by Richard C. Tatton, CSR 
Clerk: Laurie Hinton 
* * * * * * * * * * 
ARRAIGNMENT/JURY TRIAL SET 
This matter came before the Court for arraignment of 
the above-named defendant on a charge of Ct. I - Aggravated 
Assault, a 3rd degree felony and Ct. II - Possession Of A 
Dangerous Weapon By A Restricted Person, a 3rd degree felony. 
Deputy Utah County Attorney Sherry Ragan appeared for and on 
behalf of the State of Utah. The defendant was present and 
represented by Gary Weight. 
The defendant waived the reading of Information and to 
the charges contained therein, entered a plea of Not Guilty. 
The defendant then waived his right to a speedy trial. 
The Court then set this matter for a jury trial on the 
23rd day of March, 1992 at the hour of 9:00 a.m.. Counsel are 
required to meet with the Court in chambers at 8:30 a.m. the 
date of the trial. 
Counsel are directed to submit Jury Instruction and 
any Special Voir Dire to the Court no later than five business 
days prior to the trial date. 
EXHIBIT 14 
A-16 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
SIOUDONE PHATHAMMAVONG, 
Defendant. 
63 
The defendant addressed the Court with a motion for a 
bill of particulars and a motion to bifurcate. Mr. Weight 
informed the Court that he will review the defendant's motions 
and file them if appropriate. 
cc: Utah County Attorney 
Gary Weight 
Adult Probation and Parole 
COPY 
GARY H. WEIGHT, (3415) 
ALDRICH# NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
Attorney for Defendant 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Telephone: 373-4912 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : MOTION TO DISMISS 
vs. : 
SIOUDONE PHATHMMAVONG, : Case No. 921400082 
Defendant- : (Judge Boyd Park) 
COMES NOW the defendant SIOUDONE PHATHMMAVONG by and through 
counsel Gary H. Weight, Esq., and moves the Court to enter an Order 
of Dismissal with prejudice of the criminal charges pending against 
the defendant in the above captioned case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On July 12, 1991, the State of Utah filed an information 
charging the defendant with aggravated assault. See a copy of the 
information attached hereto marked Exhibit "1" and made a part 
hereof by this reference. 
2. The information issued by the County Attorney's Office was 
based upon an investigation by Orem Police Officers who discovered 
1 
EXHIBIT 15 
information charging an identical offense cannot be used 
by a prosecutor to avoid a mandate of the statute as was 
done in this case. 
The Supreme Court reversed the verdicts and judgments of the trial 
court. 
In this case the dismissal of the aggravated assault and 
refiling of an aggravated assault with weapons enhancement does not 
extend the 120 day disposition nor affect the commencement of the 
120 day period. The addition of a separate count of possession by 
a restricted person does not restart the 120 day disposition. 
It is the contention of the defendant PHATHMMAVONG, that the 
record is devoid of any evidence supporting "good cause" for 
continuing the trial of this case beyond the 120 days set by the 
statute. Defendant further contends that all charges against him 
should be dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED and SIGNED this ^i£-
 d a y o f March, 1992. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, pcstage prepaid, a copy of the 
foregoing instrument to, Sherry Regan, 100 East Center, Suite 2100, 
Provo, Utah 84606, this HrV day of W&VzlA, 1992. 
4- YM \lj{i\Jfu 
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RECEIVED MAR 1 3 1992 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY 
********** 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case Number: 921400082 
Date: March 17, 1992 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
********** 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion 
To Dismiss. 
The Court having read the Defendant's Motion To 
Dismiss, and Plaintiff's Response To Defendant's Motion To 
Dismiss and the Defendant's Reply To Plaintiff's Response To 
Motion To Dismiss, and having reviewed the file and being fully 
informed on the premises makes the following findings and 
conclusions: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1. The Defendant is charged in an Information filed 
February 20, 1992 with Ct. I: Aggravated Assault, a Third 
Degree Felony alleged to have occurred on or about June 14, 
1991, in Utah County, Utah. Ct. II: Possession Of A Dangerous 
Weapon By A Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony alleged to 
have occurred on or about June 14, 1991, in Utah County, Utah. 
Notice is further given in the Information that if a firearm or 
a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the 
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court may 
additionally enhance the sentence of the person convicted for 
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
SIOUDONE PHATHAMMAVONG, 
Defendant. 
EXHIBIT 16 
2. The following calendar of events are m* 
between the part ies: 
OCCURRANCE: DATE; 
June 14/15, 1991 
July 12, 1991 
August 5, 1991 
August 27, 1991 
September 5, 1991 
September 19, 1991 
October 8, 1991 
October 9, 1991 
The alleged incident involving 
defendant occurred. 
State of Utah filed an Informa 
The defendant was apprehended 
arrested. 
The Defendant was sent to priso**^  
pre-revocation hearing Informatic 
The Defendant attended a waivez 
hearing. 
The Defendant signed a Notice aiiM 
Request For Disposition Pending 
Charges. (Exhibit 5 to Defendant?] 
Motion To Dismiss.) 
Receipt of a Notice And Requested; 
Disposition Of Pending Charges 
Authorized Agent at the Utah StajSef 
Prison. (Exhibit 5 to Defendant''* 
Motion To Dismiss.) 
A preliminary hearing was heard \n^cn 
Circuit Court. Allegations were raa8jp 
that the witnesses had been threatejieig1 
with retaliation by the defendant or 
members of the defendant's family., 
Witness Amy Sumner was subpoenaed, 
appeared and indicated that because of 
threats she did not want to testify. 
Subpoenaed Chad Grigalda did not 
appear. Counsel for the plaintiff# 
State of Utah, and defense attorney 
John Musselman met with Judge Dimick 
in chambers to allow the State to 
continue with the preliminary hearing 
to question one Raymond Bray, the 
investigator hired by the defendant. 
Rciymond Bray was placed under oath and 
refused to answer questions ^  involving 
his actions regarding the witnesses 
and his investigation by invoking the 
fifth amendment privilege. The 
preliminary hearing was reset to 
October 21, 1991. 
October 11, 1991 Defendant's Notice And Request 
Disposition Of Pending Charges 
received by the Utah County At to: 
Office. (Exhibit 7 to Defendantr" 
Motion To Dismiss.) 
October 21, 1991 
October 25, 1991 
November 15, 1991 
November 22, 1991 
Preliminary hearing resumed with the 
defendant and new counsel for the 
defendant Jimi Mitsunaga. Counsel, for 
the defendant requested that the 
preliminary hearing be continued 'so 
that he could review the transcripts 
of the interviews of witnesses done by 
Officer Larsen. Preliminary hearing 
continued to October 25, 1991. 
Preliminary hearing continued, Circuit 
Court bound the defendant over to 
District Court. 
Arraignment in District Court. A 
Transportation Order was not prepared, 
the defendant was not present. 
Arraignment continued to November 22, 
1991. 
Defendant arraigned. Trial set for 
December 11, 1991 before Judge 
Christensen. 
December 11, 1991 Parties appeared for trial, jury 
called, plaintiff indicated to the 
Court and to defense counsel that a 
witness, Mr. Hodge, had just been 
discovered and was present in court 
and ready to testify. Counsel for the 
defendant moved to continued the trial 
to interview the recently discovered 
witness. John Hodge, the recently 
discovered witness, had indicated that 
he had been contacted by defendant's 
sister and through another friend and 
had been requested to testify falsely 
regarding the defendant's case. 
Defendant's counsel requested a 
continuance in order to interview Mr. 
John Hodge. The Court continued the 
trial to January 6, 1992. 
A-18(c) 
January 6, 1992 
January 13, 1992 
January 22, 1992 
February 18, 1992 
February 28, 1992 
Court was ready for trial, the jury 
was called, and plaintiff had 
previously filed a Motion To Amend The 
Information based on additional 
information from newly discovered 
witnesses. The Court denied the 
State's Motion To Amend The 
Information, and plaintiff moved to 
dismiss the Information against the 
defendant. The defendant objected to 
the Motion To Dismiss. The Court 
granted the Motion To Dismiss. 
A new Information was sworn to and 
issued by the Circuit Court involving 
the State of Utah vs. the defendant 
herein. This Information is the 
subject matter of the current 
lawsuit. Defendant appeared for a 
first felony appearance on this date. 
Defendant appeared with new counsel, 
Gary Weight, for preliminary hearing. 
Mr. Weight moved for a continuance of 
the preliminary hearing. Court 
granted the defendant's motion to 
continue and the preliminary hearing 
was set for February 18, 1992. 
Preliminary hearing was held. 
Defendant filed a Motion To Stay 
Proceedings pending the outcome of the 
Writ of Habeas Corpus. Court denied 
this motion and bound the defendant 
over to the District Court to appear 
on February 28, 1992. 
Defendant appeared with Mr. 
Gary Weight for arraignment. 
Defendant pled not guilty and the 
court set a trial date for March 23, 
1992. 
3. Defendant filed on March 4, 1992 a Motion To 
Dismiss alleging that under 77-29-1 U.C.A., the defendant had 
given appropriate notice of demand for disposition of pending 
charges within 120 days. The defendant has not been tried 
within 120 days from the date of the demand, which would be 
either October 8, 1991, the date the said demand was 
received by the authorized agent at the Utah State Prison or 
October 11, 1991, the date that Utah County Attorney received 
notice of defendant's demand. 
4. Defendant further alleged that his rights have been 
violated pursuant to statute and that February 8, 1992 is the 
very latest date that the State could have appropriately tried 
the defendant. That the Utah County Attorney's Office actually 
received notice on the 11th of October, 1991 and 12 0 days added 
thereto would be February 8, 1992. Defendant further alleges 
that there is no good cause why the defendant could not have 
been tried within the 120 days and therefor the court is 
mandated to dismiss the action against the defendant. 
5. Plaintiff has further alleged that defendant's 
continual changing of counsel, request for continuances, and 
the defendant's frustration of the plaintiff's case by threats 
having been made to witnesses through defendant's family, 
friends and/or investigator has delayed bringing the case to 
trial. Plaintiff contends that there is good cause shown and 
that the Court should not grant the defendant's Motion To 
Dismiss. 
6. The Court in the review of the record finds that 
the defendant's counsel made a motion for continuance on 
October 21, 1991 and that the preliminary hearing was continued 
from October 21, 1991 to October 25, 1991, a total of four 
days. The Court further finds that on December 11, 
1991,defendant requested a continuance of the trial to 
interview a newly discovered witness and that the trial was 
continued to January 6, 1992, a total of 26 days. The Court 
further finds that on January 22, 1992 counsel for the 
defendant requested a continuance of the preliminary hearing 
and the preliminary hearing was continued to February 18, 1992 
for a total of 27 days. The Court finds that pursuant to the 
defendant's request for continuance, the matter has been 
continued for a total of 57 days. 
A-18(e) 
7. The Court concludes that from October 20, 1991 
through March 23, 1992, (the date set for trial in this matter) 
that there would be a total of 164 days elapse since the 
defendant gave notice to the Utah County Attorney of his demand 
for disposition of pending charges. The Court relies upon 
State of Utah v. Valesquez, 641 P2d 115 (Jan. 8, 1982). In 
that case Justice Hall concluded, "The 42 day postponement 
caused by defendant cannot reasonably be included within the 90 
day period prescribed by 77-65-1. (Predecessor to 77-29-1 
U.C.A.) The obvious purpose of this statute is to protect the 
constitutional right of prisoners to a speedy trial and to 
'prevent those charged with enforcement of criminal statutes 
from holding over the head of a prisoner undisposed of charges 
against him.' fState v. Wilson, 22 UT2d 361, 453 P2d 158) 
When the prisoner himself acts to delay trial on such charges, 
he indicates his willingness to temporarily waive this 
protection; the purpose behind the statute does no longer 
exist. fState v. Bonnie, 25 UT2d 117, 477 P2d 147) A 
reasonable interpretation 7 7-65-1 U.C.A. requires that the 
original 90 day disposition period be extended by the amount of 
time during which the defendant himself has created delay." 
The Valesquez decision has been followed in the following Utah 
cases, State v. Banner, 717 P2d 1325, 1329 and State v. Ossana, 
747 P2d 440, 433. 
8. The Court concluding that on March 23, 1992 there 
will have elapsed 164 days from the date of the defendant's 
demand. The Court concluding that 57 of those days were due to 
defendant's requests for continuances. The Court in conformity 
with the Valesquez decision should add the 57 days to the 12 0 
days, for a total of 177 days. The Trial setting of March 23, 
1992 is well within the total of 177 days. 
9. Defendant's Motion To Dismiss is denied. 
10. Counsel for the plaintiff is directed to prepare 
and serve on counsel for defendant appropriate Findings, 
7V 1 Q < -F V 
Conclusions a J Order in accordance with the foregoing, and 
then submit such documents to the Court for signature. 
Dated at Provor UT this 17th^ jday^ of March, 1992. 
JURTJ 
L. PARK, JUDGE 
cc; Sherry Ragan 
Gary Weight 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
********** 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
- v s -
SIOUDONE PHATHAMMAVONG, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
AND COMMITMENT 
CASE NUMBER: 921400082 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
Rpt. Richard Tatton, CSR 
Clerk: Laurie Hinton 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for 
pronouncement of judgment and sentence on the 8th day of May 
1992. Deputy Utah County Attorney Sherry Ragan appeared for 
and on behalf of the State of Utah. The defendant appeared in 
person and was represented by attorney Gary Weight. The Court, 
having reviewed the Presentence Investigation Report and being 
fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the 
following Judgment, Sentence and Commitment: 
J U D G M E N T 
The defendant on the 23rd day of March, 1992, having 
been convicted by a jury with a verdict of guilty of the 
offense of Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree Felony, as 
charged in the Information; the Court finding no legal reason 
why judgment should not be pronounced, it is ordered and 
adjudged that the defendant: is guilty as charged and convicted. 
Mr. Weight motioned the Court to arrest judgment on the 
grounds of lack of jurisdiction. Ms. Ragan responded. Court 
has previously made findings and a ruling on this matter. 
Court denied the motion. 
Mr. Weight motioned the Court for leave to withdraw as 
counsel for the defendant after sentencing. 
EXHIBIT 17 
S E N T E N C E 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
defendant Sioudone Phathammavong is sentenced to be confined in 
the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five (5) years. Court further ordered that the sentence 
may run concurrently with any other sentence that the defendant 
is now serving, 
C O M M I T M E N T 
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the 
Department Of Corrections to be transported to the Warden of 
the Utah State Prison in execution of this judgment and 
sentence, 
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S 
Pursuant to the Utah Code Annotated 77-27-13(5), the 
Court provides the following information; 
(a) TERMS FOR WHICH THE OFFENDER, IN THE OPINION OF 
THE COURT, SHOULD BE IMPRISONED: As prescribed in the Utah 
Sentence and Release Guidelines. 
(b) CHARACTER OF THE OFFENDER: Unknown 
(c) AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES: Unknown 
(d) MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES: Unknown 
Dated this 8th day of May, 199 
/BY TH£ 
^-^/BOYD'L. PARK, JUDGE 
A loa 1! 
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^ <-/ -> 
D. JOHN MUSSELMAN (5582) for: 
ELKINS & MUSSELMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, UT 84601 
Telephone: 374-1212 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL / 
Case No. 911400516 
SIOUDONNE PHATHAMMAVONG, 
Defendant. 
oooOooo 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through his counsel of record, D. 
JOHN MUSSELMAN, and does hereby give notice of his intent to appeal to 
the Utah Court of Appeals from that certain JUDGEMENT, SENTENCE AND 
COMMITMENT entered in the above cause on May 8, 1992, a copy of which 
is attached hereto and made a part hereof by this reference. 
DATED this f2Z^ day of May, 1992. 
D. JOHN MUSSELMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
EXHIBIT 18 
A-20 
115 
M A I L I N G C E R T I F I C A T E 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Notice ot Appeal, postage prepaid, to Carlyle Kay Bryson, 
100 East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, UT »460h, this £-P-~- day of May, 
1992. 
OAs-L. . Af.-c 
D. >TOHN MUSSELMAN 
A-20(b) 
